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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
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JACKSON LAND AND
. LIVESTOCK COMPANY
a corporation
plaintiff,

vs.

Plain tiff's
Reply Brief
No. 7904

. :_-THE STATE TAX COMMISSION
. OF UTAH,

defendant.

On a Writ of Certorari Directed to The State Tax
Commission of Utah

PRESTON & HARRIS,
Attorneys for plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
J~\.CI~SOX I~~-\ND

Lf\ .. ESTOCI(
a corporation

.A.ND

CO~fP-4-\.NY
,

plaintiff,

vs.

Plaintiff's
Reply Brief
No. 7904

THE ST~:\.TE TAX COMMISSION
OF l-.-TAH,
defendant.

Since counsel for the Commission based the argument against exemption on the similarity between the
State Franchise Tax and the Federal Income Tax· on
corporations, we feel that it will be helpful to make a
comparison of the two laws. Lnder the laws of Utah
all agricultural corporations are specifically exempt,
whether for profit or not, and if this broad exemption
had not been intended the legislature could easily have
said :~o.
Applying the same argument to the Federal Income Tax we find that the Congress actually made a distinction bet\veen taxable and non-taxable agricultural
organizations. The Internal Revenue Code, 1951, provided for this distinction by 'vhat is known as· the irnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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position of the "Supplement U Tax". (See PrenticeI-Iall Fede~al 'rax Service, 1952, - 9-4-52, Vol. 1, page
4291) Sec. 421, of I. R. C., as follows: "Supplement
l r-Taxation of Business Income of Certain Section
101 Organizations (Note: Section 101 corresponds to
the Utah law on exempt corporations). (a) In General:
'r'herP shall be levied, collected, and paid for each taxable year beginning after December 31, 1950 . . . (A)

ORGANIZATIONS EXElVIPT UNDER SECTION 101
(1) (Note: 101 (1) is the I. R. C. section exempting
labor, argricultural and horticultural organizations).
The taxes imposed by subsection (a) (1) shall apply
in the case of any organization . . . which is exempt,
except as provided in this supplement, from taxation
under this chapter by reason of paragraph (1), (6).
or (7) of section 101.
Supplement r-:- then sets forth the rates of taxation
on various incomes and classifications of corporations.
Of course, Supplement lT has been altered from time
to time. The last one was aimed at the prevalent practice of "lease back agreen1ents," but carried the usual
Supplement U taxation which has characterized the
Federal Statutes for years. Thus, if one reads onl~·
Section 101, he gains the in1pression that the Federal
statutes and the State statutes are the sa1ne. Sueh
is distinctly not the ease. Our statute grants a blanket
exemption \vith no stated exceptions. The Federal
·statute creates only an exen1pt classification, and re-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
ferene~ n1ust then be had to Supplement U to determine
\Yhethr any corporation falls within the exemption. This
becon1es ~o~ because of other provisions of the Internal
ReYenue Code~ \Yhieh describe the character of the organizations \Yhich Inay be deemed as exempt. That is to
say, a charitable organization may be exempt, but if it
lu1s "-hat the Code calls "unrelated business net inconle ~ ·~ ~uch inco1ne is subject to the tax, even though
the con1pany n1ay still be an exe1npt corporation. Thus,
regulation 111. Sec. 29.101 (1)-1, Prentice-Hall, supra.
page -122-± states: ''Similarly, corporations engaged· in
growing agricultural or horticultural products for profit
are not exempt from tax. For taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1950, organizations othervvise exeinpt from tax under this section (101-(1)) are taxable
upon their Supplement l~ net incon1e. See sections 421
through 424, and the regulations thereunder.''
Thus, our State Tax Commission cannot follow the
Federal practice because they do not have the same statutory power to do so, and citations from Federal deci~ions will not be based on the same reasoning, because
of the terms of Supplen1ent U which provides a tax
on all organizations which make a profit from their
operations for the benefit of stockholders or members,
and it is this profit which it c.alls "unrelated business
net incoine". If our statute had a similar "supplement
U" provision 've may be taxable. Lacking it, vve are
not taxable, and the statute is so clear and unequivoc~
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able, that it needs no reference to any report of legis-

lative proceedings for clarification.
The objection we see to the arguments in defendant's brief is that it ignores acknowledged and long
Pstablished rules of statutory construction. It is only
in cases where language is ambiguous that we need
to construe a statute. Our Statute says in simple language that an "agricultural corporation is exempt".
It would have been simple for the legislature to have
said ''agricultural corporations not organized for profit,
are exempt''. Why did the legislature use different
la!lguage in sub-sec. (1) than in the others~
"Where language is used in one section different from that employed in other sections of the
same chapter and from that used in statutes
which existed prior to its enactment, it is to be
presu1ned that the language is used with a different intent." Wine v. Comrnonwealth, (Mass.)

17 N. E. 2d 545, 120 A. L. R. 889.
This Court has repeatedly refused to write judicial
legislation into statutes vvhere the meaning is already
clear:
''Those who are qualified under the statute are
entitled to the benefit of the exemption; while
under the 1naxim that, \Vhen a statute enumerates
the things upon 'vhich it is to operate, it is to
be construed as excluding from its effect all tho8e
not expressly Inentioned. Those \Vho cannot qualif}T under the st~tute are to be excluded from its
operation. '' Zuniga ·v. Evans (Utah) 48 P. 2d
513.
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Neither is resort to be had to legislative debate~
and con11nission reports 'vhen the meaning of a statute
is clear and needs no interpretation. The U. S. Supreme
Court, Addison Y. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 US
607, 153 ..:\.. L. R. 1107 set this matter at rest involving
an ad:rninistrative interpretation:
'lo The natural meaning of words cannot be displaced by reference to difficulties of administration. For the ultimate question is what has Congress commanded, 1vhen it has given no clue to
its intentions except familiar English words and
no hint by the draftsmen of the words that they
1neant to use the1n in any but an ordinary sense.
The idea which is now sought to be read into the
grant by Congress to the Administrator to define 'the area of production' beyond the plain
geographic implications of that phrase is not so
complicated nor is English speech so poor that
\Vords were not easily available to expres~ \
the idea or at least to suggest it''.
The language of the Supreme Court of Montana
is apt:
''To reach the result contended for by appellants,
subdivision ( 4) would have to read: 'On debts
(originally) secured hy mortgages, etc.' We have
neither the power nor the right to read/the word
'originally' or language of sin1ilar in1port into
the statute. Our office is sin1ply to ascertain
and declare what is in terms or in substance
contained herein, not to insert what has been
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted".
(Siuru v. Sell, 91 P. 2d 411, 123 A. L. R. 432).
Since writing the original brief we have discovered
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a tax on the doing of business. The question there
'vas whether or not the Supreme Court would restrict

the exemption :
"It has been said that, inasmuch as we are
dealing with an exemption from taxation, the
rule of strict construction applies, and this will
be admitted. That rule, however, does not call
for giving to words used in creating the exemption anything but their ordinary meaning. As
we view it, the legislative intent is not stated
in ambiguous language, nor is it doubtful''. (Yakima Fruit, etc. v. Henneford, 47 P. 2d 831, 100
A. L. R. 435).
That is the reason why the cases cited by opposing
Counsel are not in point, as for example the much
cited Norvill v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170,
97 P. 2d 937.
Respectfully submitted,
PRESTON & HARRIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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